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ABSTRACT
Objectives To examine the causes of adverse events
(AEs) and potential prevention strategies to minimise the
occurrence of AEs in hospitalised patients.
Methods For the 744 AEs identiﬁed in the patient record
review study in 21 Dutch hospitals, trained reviewers
were asked to select all causal factors that contributed
to the AE. The results were analysed together with data
on preventability and consequences of AEs. In addition,
the reviewers selected one or more prevention strategies
for each preventable AE. The recommended prevention
strategies were analysed together with four general
causal categories: technical, human, organisational and
patient-related factors.
Results Human causes were predominantly involved in
the causation of AEs (in 61% of the AEs), 61% of those
being preventable and 13% leading to permanent
disability. In 39% of the AEs, patient-related factors were
involved, in 14% organisational factors and in 4%
technical factors. Organisational causes contributed
relatively often to preventable AEs (93%) and AEs
resulting in permanent disability (20%). Recommended
strategies to prevent AEs were quality assurance/peer
review, evaluation of safety behaviour, training and
procedures. For the AEs with human and patient-related
causes, reviewers predominantly recommended quality
assurance/peer review. AEs caused by organisational
factors were considered preventable by improving
procedures.
Discussion Healthcare interventions directed at human
causes are recommended because these play a large
role in AE causation. In addition, it seems worthwhile to
direct interventions on organisational causes because the
AEs they cause are nearly always believed to be
preventable. Organisational factors are thus relatively
easy to tackle. Future research designs should allow
researchers to interview healthcare providers that were
involved in the event, as an additional source of
information on contributing factors.
Several studies in various countries have shown
that a substantial number of patients experience
adverse events (AEs) in hospitals.
1e9 These studies
have reported AE incidence rates ranging from 2.9%
to 16.6% of all hospital admissions. Of the AEs, 25%
to 50% were considered preventable, and in 5% to
13% of the AEs the patient died. The studies on the
incidence of AEs have enlarged the sense of urgency
to take effective countermeasures to increase
patient safety in hospitals. Reduction of AEs can
only be achieved if these interventions tackle the
dominant underlying causes. To explore the causes
of AEs and to gain more insight into potential
prevention strategies, we carried out additional
analyses of data that were gathered in the Dutch
patient record review study.
91 0
In accordance with the theoretical framework of
Reason,
11 the focus of our study was on active
human behavioural failures and on latent factors
present within the system (organisational and
technical factors) before an accident sequence
involving human behaviour actually begins. In
other words, healthcare providers’ behaviour was
not the single point of attention; the conditions
under which they work were considered important
as welldfor example, the design of equipment that
healthcare providers have to work with or the
number of staff installed by hospital management.
When planning quality and patient safety inter-
ventions in hospitals, information about prevention
strategies that tackle the causal factors to prevent
future AEs is valuable. Perhaps the most effective
strategies to reduce AEs are improving technology,
optimising procedures or training programmes for
healthcare providers. Therefore, the reviewers in our
study assessed potential prevention strategies next
to the causes of the AEs. This information can be an
aid for policy-makers in healthcare.
The objectives of our study were to gain more
insight into (a) the causes of AEs, (b) the relation-
ship between the causes of AEs and the prevent-
ability and health consequences of the AEs, (c)
potential prevention strategies to prevent AEs and
(d) the relevance of the prevention strategies for
each main causal factor type.
METHODS
Study design and setting
A retrospective patient record review study was
conducted to examine AEs in Dutch hospitals with
a stratiﬁed random sample of 21 hospitals: 4
university, 6 tertiary teaching and 11 general
hospitals. From each hospital, a stratiﬁed random
sample was selected of 200 admissions of patients
discharged from the hospital in 2004 (>24 h stay)
and 200 (or less if the total of patients who died in
2004 was lower) admissions of patients deceased in
the hospital in 2004, excluding admissions of
psychiatry, obstetrics and children <1 year old.
Admissions of deceased patients and patients
admitted to university hospitals were oversampled.
The methods of determining AEs were based on
previous AE studies in other countries and have
been described in detail elsewhere.
10
Structured review of patient records
Between August 2005 and October 2006, 55 trained
physicians reviewed the medical, nursing and, if
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contained triggers (clues) for AEsdfor example, an unplanned
readmission, unplanned return to the operating room or unex-
pected death. The presence of one or more of the 18 predeﬁned
triggers was judged in advance by trained nurses. For each patient
record, two physician reviewers determined independently the
presence, consequences and degree of preventability of the AEs,
based on a standardised procedure and review form. An AE was
deﬁned as an unintended injury among hospitalised patients that
results in disability, death or prolonged hospital stay, and was
caused by healthcare management. Preventable refers to care that
fell below the current level of expected performance for practi-
tioners or systems. Disability was deﬁned as temporary or
permanent impairment of physical or mental function attribut-
able to the AE (including prolonged or strengthened treatment,
readmission and death).
10
In total, 7926 patient records were reviewed. The reviewers
identiﬁed 744 AEs in the records. When generalised to all
hospital admissions, the AE incidence rate was 5.7% (corrected
for overrepresentation of patients admitted to a university
hospital and patients who died in hospital). Forty per cent of the
AEs were considered preventable and 12.8% resulted in perma-
nent disability (including death). Detailed results of this study
are reported in a previous publication.
9
Part of the review procedure was an assessment of the
underlying causes and prevention strategies of each AE as judged
by the physician reviewers. The review form presented ﬁve main
causal factor categories to choose from: technical, human,
organisational, patient-related and other. For each AE, reviewers
selected one or more of these main causal factors based on the
information in the medical record and their perception of the
situation. Having opted technical, organisational and/or human
causes, reviewers selected one or more subcategories of causal
factors within these main categories. The causal factor cate-
gories were derived from a recognised taxonomy of root causes:
the Eindhoven Classiﬁcation Model (ECM) of PRISMA-Medical,
a root cause analysis tool.
12 13 The taxonomy includes concepts
of the theoretical frameworks of Reason
11 and Rasmussen.
14
Reason’s system approach to accident causation can be seen in
the recognition of latent factors (organisational and technical)
next to active failures (human). The human categories of the
ECM ﬁt in the skill-rules-knowledge framework (SRK frame-
work) of Rasmussen (see Box 1).
Reason used the SRK framework for his Model of Unsafe
Acts, in which “violation” is added to the basic error types of the
SRK framework.
11 Violations are deliberate deviations from rules
or procedures. The ECM does not cover the concept of violations.
We have added violations to the taxonomy to cover all concepts
of the Model of Unsafe Acts. In table 1, the main causal factor
categories and subcategories are listed and explained.
Beside the causal factor categories, the review form distin-
guished 10 prevention strategies (table 2). The categories were
based on PRISMA
13 and the Canadian patient record review
study.
7 For each AE, the reviewers could select one or more
prevention strategies that they judged relevant for the AE.
There were two reviewers per AE. Both reviewers could select
more than one cause and more than one prevention strategy per
AE. We reported all causes and prevention strategies that were
selected by this panel of two physicians irrespective of whether
one or both reviewers selected the particular cause or prevention
strategy. We wanted to ﬁnd a broad variety of indications to
improve patient safety in our exploratory study and we did not
intend the reviewers to reach a shared conclusion. Because there
is a lot of information in patient records, the likelihood of
missing a causal factor (false negative) will be larger than the
likelihood that a causal factor is selected mistakenly when in
reality it does not exist (false positive). Thus, reviewers were
considered complementary to each other.
When both reviewers selected the same causal factor or
prevention strategy for an AE, these were counted only once in
the analyses.
Statistical analysis
Causes of AEs and prevention strategies were analysed using
descriptive statistics and frequency tables. Frequencies were
calculated using weights that corrected for overrepresentation of
patients admitted to a university hospital and for over-
representation of patients who died in hospital. The sampling
weight was the inverse of the probability of being included in
the sample owing to the sampling design.
9
For 8 of the 744 AEs, neither of the reviewers ﬁlled out any of
the items in the review form about causal factors. Consequently,
results on causal factors will be presented for 736 AEs. For the
prevention strategies, results of the 315 AEs that were consid-
ered preventable will be presented. All statistical analyses were
performed using SPSS V.14.0.
RESULTS
Causes of AEs (objectives a and b)
The 736 AEs were associated with 1017 main causal factors
because reviewers could select more than one category per AE.
Figure 1 presents the weighted percentages of the ﬁve main
causal factor categories. Human causes were predominantly
involved in AE causation (in 61% of the AEs). In 39% of the AEs,
patient-related factors were involved. In 14% of the AEs, organ-
isational factors contributed to the AE, in 4% technical factors
and in 19% other factors.
Organisational factors had a relatively high proportion of AEs
that were preventable (out of all AEs with an organisational
cause involved, 93% was considered preventable), followed by
human causes (61% of all AEs with human causes). Organisa-
tional factors also had a relatively high proportion of AEs that
led to permanent disability (20%). Technical factors had low
proportions of preventable AEs (22%) and AEs resulting in
Box 1 Skill-based, rules-based and knowledge-based
behaviour
14
To understand the mechanisms behind human error, Rasmussen
developed the skill-rules-knowledge framework (SRK frame-
work), with the notion that human behaviour can be controlled at
different levels of conscious control, dependent on the degree of
familiarity with the task and the environment. At the skill-based
level, behaviour is regulated by the lowest level of conscious
involvement and is characteristic of highly routinised and auto-
mated activities. The individual is seldom able to verbalise how
performance of the behaviour is controlled or explain the infor-
mation on which the performance is based. Rule-based behaviour
requires some degree of conscious involvement; at this level,
behaviour is controlled by stored rules derived from experience or
other’s know-how. At this level, performance is typically based
on speciﬁc ability and the rules for performance can be verbal-
ised. At the knowledge-based level, stored rules do no longer
apply and a novel situation is presented for which a plan must be
developed to solve a problem. Here, the individual uses
conceptual reasoning or trial-and-error.
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Main category Subcategory Code Description
Latent conditions
Technical Design TD Failures due to poor design of equipment,
software, labels or forms
Construction TC Correct design, which was not constructed
properly or was set up incorrectly
Materials TM Material defects
External T-ex Technical failures beyond the control and
responsibility of the investigating organisation
Organisational Transfer of knowledge OK Failures resulting from inadequate measures
taken to ensure that situational or domain-speciﬁc
knowledge or information is transferred to all new
or inexperienced staff
Protocols OP Failures relating to the quality and availability of
the protocols within the department (too
complicated, inaccurate, unrealistic, absent or
poorly presented)
Management priorities OM Internal management decisions in which safety is
relegated to an inferior position when faced with
conﬂicting demands or objectives. This is
a conﬂict between production needs and safety.
Example: decisions that are made about stafﬁng
levels
Culture OC Failures resulting from a collective approach and
its attendant modes of behaviour to risks in the
investigating organisation
External O-ex Failures at an organisational level beyond the
control and responsibility of the investigating
organisation
Active errors
Human Knowledge-based behaviour Knowledge-based behaviour HKK The inability of an individual to apply his/her
existing knowledge to a novel situation
Rule-based behaviour Qualiﬁcations HRQ An incorrect ﬁt between an individuals training or
education and a particular task
Coordination HRC A lack of task coordination within a healthcare
team in an organisation. Example: an essential
task not being performed because everyone
thought that someone else had completed the
task
Veriﬁcation HRV The correct and complete assessment of
a situation including related conditions of the
patient and materials to be used before starting
the intervention
Intervention HRI Failures that result from faulty task planning and
execution. Example: washing red cells by the
same protocol as platelets
Monitoring HRM Monitoring a process or patient status. Example:
a trained technologist operating an automated
instrument and not realising that a pipette that
dispenses reagents is clogged
Skill-based behaviour Slips HSS Failures in performance of highly developed skills.
Example: a computer entry error
Tripping HST Failures in whole body movements. These errors
are often referred to as “slipping, tripping or
falling”. Examples: a blood bag slipping out of
one’s hands and breaking or tripping over a loose
tile on the ﬂoor
External H-ex Human failures originating beyond the control and
responsibility of the investigating organisation
Violations Violations V Failures by deliberate deviations from rules or
procedures
Other factors
Patient related Patient-related factor PRF Failures related to patient characteristics or
conditions, which are beyond the control of staff
and inﬂuence treatment. Example: communicative
skills, treatment compliance
Other Unclassiﬁable X Failures that cannot be classiﬁed in any other
categorydeg, complication, abstain policy, rare
disease
Descriptions (except for “violations”) are derived from Van Vuuren et al
12 and Van der Schaaf and Habraken.
13
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were preventable and led to permanent disability, the distribu-
tion of causal factors shows that in these AEs there were nearly
always human causes involved (94%), frequently organisational
(36%) and patient-related causes (33%), and rarely technical
causes (1%) (ﬁgure 2).
For the technical, human and organisational categories, one or
more speciﬁc subcategories of causes were selected as well. The
results are presented in table 3 (see also Appendix for examples).
Material defects were the most common technical factors (34%
of all AEs with technical causes). Contrary to the other technical
factors,materialdefects wereallassociatedwith preventableAEs.
Human causes were predominantly knowledge based (46% of
all AEs with human causes) and/or related to rule-based failures
regarding monitoring (27%), intervention (26%) and/or veriﬁca-
tion (21%). These causal factors, as well as violations, were asso-
ciated with large proportions of preventable AEs (74% to 89%).
Transfer of knowledge was the most frequent organisational
factor contributing to AEs (50% of all AEs with organisational
causes). Failures relating to the quality and availability of
protocols were related to the highest proportion of AEs with
permanent disability (33%).
Potential prevention strategies (objectives c and d)
For all preventable AEs (n¼315), reviewers selected 871 preven-
tion strategies (table 4). Quality assurance/peer review was the
most frequently selected strategy (65%), followed by evaluation
(53%) training (50%) and procedures (40%). Financial invest-
ments, up-scaling of the problem to a higher organisational level
and increasing the number of personnel were least often
considered as relevant methods to prevent AEs (2% to 3%).
For the AEs with human and patient-related causes, reviewers
predominantlyrecommendedqualityassurance/peerreview(68%
and 78%, respectively). AEs caused by organisational factors were
considered preventable by improving procedures (67%).
DISCUSSION
General ﬁndings
The study provides an initial overview of causes of AEs and
required remedial action. The causes identiﬁed by the reviewers
were predominantly related to human errors, especially knowl-
edge-based and rule-based errorsdfor example, incorrect
reasoning by a healthcare provider or not verifying if all necessary
instruments were present before the start of a procedure. AEs
with organisational factors involved were relatively often
preventable and resulted relatively often in permanent disability,
particularly AEs caused by inadequate or unavailable protocols.
Overall, technical factors (eg, an inadequate construction of
equipment) contributed relatively less often to preventable AEs
and AEsresulting in permanent disability.However,the technical
factors within the material defects subgroup all contributed to
preventable AEs.
Table 2 Explanation of prevention strategy categories
Prevention strategies Description
Technology/equipment Redesigning of hardware, software or interface parts of the manemachine system
Procedures Completing or improving formal and informal procedures
Information and communication Completing or improving available sources of information and communication structures
Training Improving (re)training programmes for skills needed
Motivation Increasing the level of voluntary obedience to generally accepted rules by applying principles of positive behaviour modiﬁcation
Up-scaling Handling the problem at a higher organisational leveldeg, hospital department or hospital management level
Evaluation Evaluating the current way of behaving regarding safety
Quality assurance/peer review Continuously monitoring of data quality based on prespeciﬁed standards and assessment of a health professional’s performance
by one or more individuals in the same ﬁeld
Financial investment Financial investments in required areasdeg, increasing the availability of facilities and equipment
Personnel Increasing the number of personnel
Descriptions of ﬁrst six prevention strategies derived from Van der Schaaf and Habraken.
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Figure 1 Percentages are weighted for over-sampling of deceased
patients and patients admitted to a university hospital (N: actualnumbers of
causes, not weighted). Reviewers could select more than one casual factor
per AE. Preventability is related to the assessment of the preventability of
the AE, not the preventability of each cause underlying the AE.
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AEs were quality assurance/peer review, evaluation of safety
behaviour, training and improvement of procedures. For AEs
with human and patient-related causes, reviewers indicated
these could be prevented by quality assurance/peer review. For
AEs caused by organisational factors, reviewers predominantly
recommended completing or improving procedures.
To sum up, active failures played a large role in AE causation,
but the reviewers also identiﬁed latent factors that were present
in the system and that contributed to AEs. To tackle active
human causes, which occurred most frequently, quality assur-
ance/peer review was recommended. To deal with latent
organisational factors, which underlie AEs that were believed to
be most preventable and were associated with the most severe
consequences, improving procedures was recommended.
Comparison with previous record review studies
Up to now, two retrospective patient record review studies have
assessed the causes of the AEs
15 16 and two have examined
possible prevention strategies.
15 17 It is quite difﬁcult to compare
our results with these and other studies on the causes and
prevention strategies of AEs because the classiﬁcations used vary
to a large extent and most studies examined the causes of
a speciﬁc group of AEs, such as medication errors. However, the
design of the Australian record review study was comparable to
ours.
21 5Wilson et al
2 reexamined the 2353 AEs identiﬁed earlier
and found that AEs in which the cause was a cognitive failure
were associated with high preventability scores. This is similar to
our ﬁndings: we found that AEs caused by human errors were
often preventable, next to AEs caused by organisational factors.
Latent factors (organisational and technical factors) were not
examined in the Australian study. Furthermore, the main
prevention strategies were comparable to our results: they
recommended new or better implemented policies and protocols,
better formal quality monitoring and better education.
15
Strengths and limitations
Our study has some advantages over previous studies on the
causes of AEs. Causes and prevention strategies were examined
directly, together with the assessment of the presence of AEs,
instead of afterwards. The reviews were thus based on original
records and not on summaries of information compiled for the
review, like in the Australian study.
15 Moreover, we used a clas-
siﬁcation of causes in ﬁve main categories, divided in several
subcategories. The categories were based on the well-established
Figure 2 Percentages are weighted for over-sampling of deceased
patients and patients admitted to a university hospital (N: actual numbers
of causes, not weighted). Reviewers could select more than one casual
factor per AE. Preventability is related to the assessment of the
preventabilityof the AE, not the preventability of each cause underlyingthe
AE.
Table 3 Causes of AEs (subcategories): proportions with preventable AEs and AEs leading to permanent disability (including death)
Causes of AEs Frequency
Percentage (column
%* within each
main category)
Preventable
AEs (row %*)
AEs with
permanent
disability row %*)
Technical Design 0 0 0 0
Construction 2 21 0 0
Materials 10 34 100 0
External 2 24 0 0
Other 3 22 0 0
Human Knowledge based Knowledge 241 46 77 21
Rule based Qualiﬁcations 32 5 69 14
Coordination 48 10 89 19
Veriﬁcation 105 21 83 18
Intervention 84 26 74 19
Monitoring 96 27 83 17
Skill based Slips 22 11 37 0
Tripping 5 3 75 0
External 5 2 50 0
Violation 126 29 81 17
Other 45 14 40 5
Organisational Protocols 32 22 92 33
Transfer of knowledge 46 50 93 24
Management priorities 7 17 100 0
Culture 30 28 100 13
External 6 5 100 0
Other 4 4 100 0
AE, adverse event.
Reviewers could select more than one causal factor per AE. Preventability is related to the assessment of the preventability of the AE, not to the preventability of each cause underlying the AE.
*Percentages are weighted for oversampling of deceased patients and of patients admitted to a university hospital.
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are often referred to in error management and patient safety
literature.
There are however some limitations. The usability of a patient
record as a means to examine the causes of AEs is limited. It is
hard to get information about all contributing factors by reading
the patient record only. Human actions are regularly reported on
in a patient record and therefore human causes are most visible
for reviewers. One can imagine that healthcare providers are less
inclined to note technical or organisational factors in the medical
or nursing record of an individual patient. This can be an
explanation for the relatively small amounts of technical and
organisational factors found in our study.
Another limitation is that there was no contact between the
reviewers and the involved healthcare professionals to gather
more information about the event and contributing factors. This
was not possible because of privacy restrictions made before the
study started and because the reviews were performed 1 to
2 years after the occurrence of the AE. Neale et al
18 attempted to
overcome these difﬁculties in their pilot study in one UK
hospital. The clinical staff of the hospital assessed patient
records, shortly after discharge, in combination with external
reviewers. Clinical teams have “inside” knowledge about the care
provided to the patients.
18
Despite the limitations, exploratory study has offered an
interesting overview of the causes and prevention strategies of
AEs.
Implications for practice and future research
The Dutch Society of Medical Specialists, among others, has
formulated a national patient safety action campaign for
hospitals “Prevent harm, work safely” in 2008. The results of the
present study served as input for this safety programme. The
programme includes quality monitoring at department level,
(team) training, evidence-based procedures and evaluations of the
Individual Functioning of Medical Specialists, including the
construction of a personal portfolio, a personal progress plan and
annual interviews about quality of care and communication with
colleagues and patients.
19
We recommend that in future research into causes of AEs
a more prospective design is used in which the period between
the occurrence of the AE and the assessment of its causes is only
a few weeks. In that case, involved healthcare providers can be
interviewed to provide more information about contributing
factors soon after the occurrence of the AE.
Finally, studies on AEs should use the same taxonomy for
causes of AEs to make national and international comparisons of
causes of AEs possible. The World Health Organization is
formulating a taxonomy of patient safety events and contrib-
uting factors.
20 21 This taxonomy is partly based on the ECM we
have used in our research.
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APPENDIX
Examples of adverse events (AEs) and their causes and potential prevention strategies
Description of AE Main causal factors Subcategories of T, H and O Prevention strategies
Leaking undersized intravascular aortic stent,
resulting in readmission and endovascular
reintervention
Technical, human Materials (TM), intervention (HRI) Technology/equipment, training,
procedures
Inadequate planning operation (ankle fracture)
resulting in extended length of stay
Organisational Management priorities (OM) Procedures, motivation, stafﬁng
Pneumonia after thoracotomy, requiring artiﬁcial
respiration and treatment with antibiotics
Other ee (not preventable)
(Blood) infusion rate too high in patient known
with heart failure and gastrointestinal bleeding,
resulting in respiratory insufﬁciency and
contributing to death
Human Knowledge (HKK), qualiﬁcation (HRQ), veriﬁcation
(HRV)
Evaluation
Not-indicated surgery of adrenal gland (lung
metastases) resulting in needless suffering,
respiratory insufﬁciency and early death
Human, organisational Knowledge (HKK), coordination (HRC), knowledge
transfer (OK)
Procedures, information and
communication, evaluation
Persistent haemorrhage of wound feeding probe Patient related ee (not preventable)
Missed diagnosis pulmonary embolism,
contributing to death
Human Knowledge (HKK), violation (V) Training, procedures, quality assurance/
peer review
Lens remains left behind after lens extraction,
requiring resurgery
Human Intervention (HRI) Training, quality assurance/peer review
*For explanation of causal factors, see table 1.
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